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Abstract
This is a reply to an article with the same title in which Kirkpatrick
claimed that the considerations I put forward some thirty years ago on quan-
tum mixtures are incorrect. It is shown here that Kirkpatrick’s reasoning is
erroneous.
1. Introduction and a preliminary remark.
In a recent paper [1] K. A. Kirkpatrick criticised the distinction I introduced long
ago [2] (see also [3] and [4]) between the notions of proper and improper mixtures.
In the present article I shall explain why, in my view, his criticism is unfounded. The
subject must first be introduced and, quite appropriately, Kirkpatrick did this by
referring to von Neumann’s book [5]. “Von Neumann – he wrote – introduced mix-
tures of pure ensembles into quantum mechanics exactly in the manner of classical
probability, as a matter of ignorance. Introducing the statistical operator (density
matrix) as the descriptor of a mixture he said: “if we do not even know what state
is actually present – for example, when several states φ1, φ2, ... with respective
probabilities w1, w2, ... constitute the description – then the statistical operator is
ρ = Σsws|φs >< φs|”. Besides, Kirkpatrick also made a recall: “... von Neumann
proved – he wrote – that the unique statistical descriptor of a subsystem S of a joint
system S +M is given by the partial trace ρS = TrM{ρ
S+M}. [...] This statistical
operator can always be expressed (in many ways) as a convex sum of pure-state
projectors, exactly in the form of the ‘ignorance’ mixture first introduced”. In his
introduction Kirkpatrick then further noted that I choosed to call proper mixtures
the mixtures defined by von Neumann in the first stated manner, improper mix-
tures those made up of the subsystems S of a composite system S +M , and that
I somehow questioned the possibility of identifying the two notions (this is why I
introduced these epithets).
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Needless to say: on all this I fully agree. Where I first start disagreeing to
some extent with Kirkpatrick is on his precise characterizing of my questioning.
He wrote: “D’Espagnat claims that an ignorance interpretation of the improper
mixture is mathematically inconsistent”. This formulation does not fully satisfy
me in that it conveys the - wrong - idea that the reason why I claim the improper
mixture cannot be given an ignorance interpretation is essentially of a mathematical
nature. This, actually, is not the case. Basically, the reason in question is, as we
shall see, not mathematical but logico-semantical. It consists of the fact that, in
science, all the words we use must be have a meaning, so that, when we say that a
given mathematical description is consistent with such and such an interpretation
we must be able to explain the meaning of the words by means of which the said
interpretation is stated. My claim essentially is that, when this is done concerning
the word “ignorance”, then, the “improper mixtures” represented by the partial
traces of a composite system pure state statistical operator cannot be given an
ignorance interpretation. It is therefore this claim that my critics should aim at
disproving. We shall see that Kirkpatrick’s paper does not succeed in doing so.
In the next section we shall go, properly speaking, into this matter. Before that,
however, it is appropriate that a preliminary remark should be made, concerning a
notion Kirkpatrick makes use of.
Preliminary remark.
It has to do with the “rule of distinguishablity”. By this name Kirkpatrick
referred to the well-known rule of quantum computation: “when the alternative
processes are indistinguishable, square the sum of their amplitudes, when distin-
guishable, sum the squares of their amplitudes”, a rule Feynman frequently used
in his books. It is true of course that, as a guide and as a “short cut” sparing te-
dious computations, the rule in question is a most useful one. It should however be
well noted that it does not rank among the basic quantum mechanical rules or “ax-
ioms” (such as the correspondence between observables and self-adjoint operators,
the quantum law of evolution or the generalized Born rule concerning probabilities
of observations). Actually, it is merely a consequence of the latter. It simply fol-
lows from the fact that, whenever a system S interacts with a system M that may
react to this impact in a nonnegligible way, in order to study what happens to S it
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is necessary to consider the wave function of the composite system S +M . If we
are interested in S alone we must of course sum over all the conceivable measure-
ment results concerning M (hence, technically, “trace M out”), and this normally
leads to the disappearance of cross-terms involving amplitudes concerning S. The
distinguishability rule follows. This shows, first that within the realm of questions
concerning which the rule of distinguishability is applicable its use is in principle
redundant (in last resort, what really counts is the detailed experimental arrange-
ment and it is on its basis that one must argue in case of doubt) and second, more
importantly, that its range of applicability is well defined. In fact, it is limited to
the type of computational problems for the investigation of which it was conceived
and proved. This means, the rule is fully reliable when we want to derive, from our
knowledge of how a system was prepared, the probabilities we have of getting such
and such measurement outcomes. But we would have no right to extend it to the
conceptual analysis of basic questions falling, partly or totally, outside this range.
Trying to apply the said rule to such questions may amount to depriving oneself of
any possibility of defining notions that are needed for their very formulation. And
indeed, in the next section it will become apparent that this is precisely the kind of
error Kirkpatrick fell into.
2. On Hugues’argument.
We can now turn to our subject proper. Kirkpatrick’s discussion of my stand-
point starts (his Section 3) as follows: “D’Espagnat insists that the improper mix-
ture, although represented by the same statistical operator as the proper mixture,
does not represent a mixture of ensembles in pure states {|φs >}; the ignorance
interpretation may not be applied to it”. He then tries to show that this view is
flawed.
To this end, he first considers the argument - very similar to my own - by means
of which R.I.G.Hughes [6] justified this distinction; so, let us begin by analysing what
he objects to Hugues. According to Kirkpatrick, Hugues’ argument runs as follows.
“Consider a composite system S +M in the pure state ρ, of which the component
states are the mixed states ρS and ρM . For the sake of the argument assume that
ρS = a1|u1 >< u1| + a2|u2 >< u2|, while ρ
M = b1|v1 >< v1| + b2|v2 >< v2|, with
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a1 6= a2 and b1 6= b2 so there are no problems of degeneracy. Then, according to the
ignorance interpretation of ρS and ρM , system S is really in one of the pure states
|u1 > or |u2 > and system M is really in one of the pure states |v1 > or |v2 >.
But this would mean that the composite system is really in one of the four states
|uj > |vk >, with probabilities aibk respectively - in other words, that the composite
system is in a mixed state. Since this contradicts our original assumption, the
ignorance interpretation simply will not do”.
After having thus, for the benefit of the discussion, reproduced Hugues’ reason-
ing, Kirkpatrick claimed that it is wrong. “This argument is so clearly stated - he
wrote - that its error stands out”. And he explained: “the claim that “the com-
posite system is in a mixed state” is not supportable - nothing external to S +M
distinguishes those states |ui > |vk > from one another. We must add the state
vectors (not the projectors) |Ψ >= Σj,kψjk|ujvk > - a pure state”.
Sweeping as these statements are, I claim they are in fact unjustified and in-
correct. Their first defect is that Kirkpatrick’s reference to non-distinguishability
is out of place. The problem we are here faced with is not one of calculating the
probabilities we have of observing this or that on a system S, given the way S was
prepared. It is a general problem of interpretating the formalism. The arguments
developed in Section 1 above (Preliminary Remark) show that the idea or trying to
apply the rule of distinguishability to such questions is unjustified.
The second defect in Kirkpatrick’s rebuttal of Hugues’ argument can be described
as follows. Note first that, in it, Kirkpatrick tacitly endorses Hugues’ assertion that
the considered composite system is really in [but] one of the four states |uj > |vk >.
Indeed, in view of the starting assumption he accepted - that S is really in one of
the pure states |u1 > or |u2 > and M is really in one of the pure states |v1 > or
|v2 > – he could not reject the said assertion (which, incidentally, means that in an
ensemble of such composite systems some of them are in state |u1 > |v1 >, some
others in state |u1 > |v2 > etc.). But on the other hand - and this is precisely the
point that makes his reasoning inconsistent - while he seems oblivious of what this
assertion usually means (in terms of differences in possessed values), he offers no
alternative definition of its meaning. Indeed, nowhere does he state what the words
“is really” actually mean to him. However, as already stressed, in any statement
aiming at objectivity all the words used should have a meaning, so that, when we
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claim that a given interpretation is consistent we must be able to explain what the
words expressing it actually signify.
Now, in science a statement is meaningful only if it corresponds, directly or
indirectly, to some conceivable piece of experience. Consequently, when Kirkpatrick,
following Hugues, states that the composite system is really in one of the states
|uj > |vk > he should be able to explain what he means by referring to some possible
experience. Not necessarily to an experience we actually have, but at least to one
that, conceivably, some people could have. This, however, he did not do. And if we
ourselves try to fill up this gap, we find that there is but one possibility. It consists
in identifying the expression “System S is really in state |u >” to the conditional
statement: “if, on S, somebody measured an observable G having |u > among its
eigenvectors he/she would, with certainty (probability 1), get as an outcome the
precise eigenvalue of which |u > is an eigenvector.
To see what this implies let us focus on the simplest possible case (implicitly but
appropriately used by both Hugues and Kirkpatrick for introducing the problem),
namely the one in which both the Hilbert spaces HS and HM of systems S and M
are two-dimensional. Let then G be the observable of S (a spin component for exam-
ple) that has {|u1 >, |u2 >} as eigenvectors and let g1 and g2 be the corresponding
eigenvalues. Similarly, let R be the observable ofM that has {|v1 >, |v2 >} as eigen-
vectors and let r1 and r2 be the corresponding eigenvalues. Hugues and Kirkpatrick
both assert that system S is really in one of the two states |uj > and that the
composite system S+M is really in one of the four |uj > |vk > states of S+M . So,
according to them, if we consider an ensemble Ê of such S +M systems the latter
must be distributed in four subensembles labelled i, k (i, k = 1 or 2). Let us then
consider the subensemble Êi,n of Ê labelled j = i and k = n. In it, all the systems
S are really in state |ui >. From the foregoing definition, we thereore know that if
G were measured on an element of this subensemble there is a probability 1 that the
outcome gi would be obtained. Then, however, we may resort to a well known (and
easily proved!) lemma that, partly using the above defined notations, can be stated
as follows. Let Q be an ensemble of composite systems S +M , let, again, G be an
observable nondegenerate in HS, having {|u1 >, |u2 >} as eigenvectors and g1, g2
as the corresponding eigenvalues and let the probability be 1 that, within Q, the
outcome of the measurement of G be gi. Then, the statistical operator (density ma-
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trix) describing Q factorizes, with |ui >< ui| as a factor. Here this lemma applies,
so that we know that the statistical operator ρi,n describing Êi,n has |ui >< ui| as a
factor. For the same reason we know that it has |vn >< vn| as a factor. It therefore
is:
ρi,n = |uivn >< uivn| . (1)
Then, however, nobody can deny that, aj and bk being the proportions defined
by Hugues in his example, Ê is describable by the density matrix
ρ′ = Σj,kajbk ρj,k (2)
for indeed, from the very way in which this Ê has been constructed it follows that
the probabilities concerning the outcomes of any measurements whatsoever that
we could choose to perform on its elements are obtained by first evaluating the
corresponding probabilities pj,k on each Êj,k and then combining them according to
the usual laws of combined probabilities, in the form
Σj,kajbk pj,k ; (3)
and it has been common knowledge ever since the appearance of von Neumann’s
book that these probabilities are exactly those yielded by ρ′.
But then, whether Kirkpatrick likes it or not, Ê is quite obviously not describable
as a pure case |Ψ >=
∑
jk ψjk|uivk > since ρ
′ is not a projector (ρ
′2 6= ρ′), a fact
implying in particular that, in whatever way we decide to choose the coefficients
ψjk, there are observables concerning which ρ
′ yields verifiable predictions differing
from those yielded by the pure case ρ = |Ψ >< Ψ|.
It follows from this that - again, however we choose the ψjk – the ensemble of
the S systems whose density matrix is obtained by partial tracing of this ρ over the
Hilbert space of M and the ensemble of the M systems obtained by the symmetri-
cal procedure (exchanging symbols S and M) cannot be mixtures defined, a la von
Neumann, as a matter of ignorance - that is, by combining subensembles endowed
with different characteristics (“proper mixtures” in my terminology) - since, as we
just showed, if they were, the ensemble of the composite S +M systems would be
describable by ρ′, which it is not. To sum up, we here have been careful to give a
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meaning to the expression “is really”, used by Hugues and endorsed by Kirkpatrick,
and consequently also to the expression “ignorance interpretation”, similarly used
by these authors, and this has led us to agree with Hugues - and disagree with
Kirkpatrick - in asserting that the ignorance interpretation cannot be applied to the
ensembles yielded by the just described partial tracing operation.
Remark
The foregoing argument may appear somewhat roundabout since we might con-
sider that, as soon as Kirkpatrick granted that the composite system “is really” in
one of the four states |ujvk >, he was thereby forced to admit that it is describable
by (2) and cannot, therefore, be in a pure state. I myself tend to be convinced by
this simplified argument but the very existence of Kirkpatrick’s paper shows that
this standpoint is not shared by everybody. The reason may be that, so long as one
just ponders on formulas without making precise what words mean – by referring
to experience –, some vagueness remains that leaves a place for disputable views.
So, after all, there is a reason for considering that the argument above is not totally
redundant.
3. The peculiarity of Quantum Mechanics.
The interpretation of Quantum Mechanics always raised conceptual problems.
It is natural that questions concerning the basic nature of quantum mixtures should
not be totally independent from these problems and it is therefore appropriate that
we should here have a look at the latter.
For that purpose, let us make a detour to classical physics. It may be consid-
ered that - perhaps setting apart classical statistical mechanics which is a debatable
case - classical physics, considered as a universal theory, was ontologically inter-
pretable. This does not mean that such an interpretation was logically necessary.
It was not. But it does mean that it was admissible, in the sense that it did not
generate contradictions. All the fields and particles that appeared in the classical
formulas could without difficulty be viewed as being really existing entities so that,
when their values or, respectively, positions were measured, the outcomes of the
measurements could, without qualms, be interpreted as revealing the values these
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quantities actually had. I use to express this fact by saying that the corresponding
statements were “strongly objective” ones. As is well known, the same does not
hold true in quantum mechanics where, for example, interpreting the wave function
as being a real entity in the above sense leads to a host of conceptual difficulties
(nature of collapse and so on). To be sure, quite a number of physicists still go on
thinking that all this questioning is just an old story. That such interpretational
problems were satisfactorily solved by Bohr a long time ago. In a sense they are
right. Bohr could write with confidence: “The description of atomic phenomena has
[] a perfectly objective character” [7]. But let us have a look at the remaining part
of this sentence of him. It reads: “... in the sense that no explicit reference is made
to any individual observer and that therefore [...] no ambiguity is involved in the
communication of observation” (emphasis ours). In other words, according to Bohr
atomic physics is indeed objective, but not in the sense that its statements describe
what really exists. Only in the sense that they are valid for anybody. This I express
by saying they are but “weakly objective”. In a way, the attempts at building up
theories of measurement that were made after Bohr’s time may be viewed as ef-
forts aimed at imparting to “orthodox” quantum mechanics the status of a strongly
objective theory, but it can be considered that these efforts failed.
Hence, quantum mechanics as we know it is not ontologically interpretable. This
is not necessarily to be considered as a defect but it implies that, in the realm of
interpretational problems such as the one here on hand, we should not argue as if
it were. In particular the “collapse riddle” should prevent us from tacitly assuming
that the wave function possesses in every circumstances all the attributes of reality.
In fact the safest way to make use of the wave function is just to consider it as a
component of a computational algorithm (or “rule”) that enables us to know the
probability we have of observing such and such a measurement outcome on a system
S when we know how S was prepared. Such measurement outcomes, described in
a kind of a realist language (the pointer is at such and such a place etc.) may then
be considered as elements of an empirical reality constituted by the phenomena un-
derstood in a Kantian sense, that is, as more than mere appearances but less than
elements of some ontologically defined Reality, since they depend partly on us.
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4. The proper mixture cannot be created.
This is the title of one of Kirpatrick’s sections and, in a sense, the statement it
conveys - presented by its author as an objection to my views - is a correct one.
Indeed, if we kling to the (here undisputed) view that a pure quantum state |Ψ >
of a system yields the maximal information that can be obtained on this system we
have to consider that the idea of an observable physical diversity that would exist,
independently of us, in an ensemble of isolated systems D described by |Ψ > is
self-contradictory, and that the time evolution operator cannot all by itself generate
that physical diversity. Concerning the case in which the systems D are composite
we must also admit that choosing to focus our attention on such and such features
of |Ψ > (by mathematical operations such as taking partial traces and so on) will
never make |Ψ > generate that physical diversity, which, however, constitutes the
defining characteristic of what von Neumann called mixtures and I called proper
mixtures. So, in this Kirkpatrick is right. Moreover, I showed ([3], chapter 17) that,
in this respect, replacing such a pure state |Ψ > by a mixture is of no help.
However, this means that the diversity in question has to be rejected, and that
the same is therefore true concerning the ignorance interpretation of the “improper”
mixtures (of subsystems of the D’s). But still we do observe diversity when, on
statistical ensembles of systems, we perform observations. So, we face a difficulty.
To study it let us consider the way Kirkpatrick presented his “proof” (that “the
proper mixture cannot be created”). We must here quote him at some lengh. He
asked “How might we go about creating a mixture, in particular a proper mixture?”.
And he continued: “We return to von Neumann’s original description of the mixed
state (echoed by d’Espagnat for the case of the proper mixture). The preparation of
the system S varies randomly among the possible output states {|αj >}; when S is
prepared in the state |αj >, the state of its relevant environment E (a system external
to S such that S+E has no correlations with its exterior) is |ηj > and the composite
system is described by the state |αjηj >. Because S+E has no exterior correlations,
these states are indistinguishable; the Indistinguishability Rule requires the state of
S + E to be pure, the sum |ΨS+E >= Σsγs|αsηs >”. He then rewrote |Ψ
S+E > in
the form of a bi-orthogonal Schmidt-like decomposition, and claimed that the state
of S is the improper mixture obtained by tracing out E on |ΨS+E >< ΨS+E |. His
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conclusion was: “it is not possible to create d’Espagnat’s proper mixture”.
I already explained why I consider that, in contexts of this type, Kirkpatrick’s
use of the Indistinguishability Rule is faulty. Here, however, this is by no means an
essential point for, in this passage, Kirkpatrick explicitly considered the preparation
of a mixture, taking the environment of the system into account. Now, when we
think in terms of preparation we may without generality loss (see above) imagine
that the combined S + E system on which the mixture of the S’s is prepared is a
pure state.
In fact, the trouble with Kirkpatrick’s approach lies at a much deeper level,
tightly connected with the fact, commented on in the foregoing section, that “or-
thodox” quantum mechanics is not (as Bohm used to say) ontologically interpretable;
that, in other words, the Reality it describes is but Empirical Reality. To see what
the said trouble consists of, it suffices to have a careful look at the structure of
Kirkpatrick’s above reported argument. What is crucial in it is the specification
that the considered environment, E , of S be “[a system external to S] such that
S + E has no correlations with its exterior”. When (or assuming that) this is the
case, everything that Kirkpatrick wrote nicely follows... but on the other hand it
is just pure mathematics, deprived of any bearing on possible observations since, in
order that we should be be able to observe anything, some interaction must take
place between us and either S or E or both. Admittedly it could be assumed that
the observing elements are themselves parts of E . But then we would have to face a
dilemma: either we consider that these “observing elements” are inanimate objects
such as counters – but then nothing is gained since these counters must themselves
be observed from outside E – or we assume that we, the “observers”, are ourselves
within E . However, we then have to face a riddle that all the (numerous) attempts
at building up a consistent quantum measurement theory have not been able to
resolve, namely the “and-or” enigma: wherefrom does it come that we have the
feeling – nay the “certainty”! – of being either in the |v1 > state or in the |v2 >
state even though the finest possible description of the whole state of affairs is of
the type c1|u1 > |v1 > +c2|u2 > |v2 > i.e. contains both |v1 > and |v2 > ? Note
that, obviously, in this matter dropping Kirkpatrick’s condition that S + E should
have no correlations with its exterior would not help.
And yet, since we are dealing not with just pure mathematics but with physics,
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we simply cannot do as if the just mentioned feeling – or rather, certainty – we have
of always seeing pointers and other objects at definite places did not exist. One way
of resolving this paradox (the only way I know of!) is to keep in mind something like
Bohr’s above quoted assertion, that is, consider that the purpose of physics is not
to describe “Reality as it really is” but, less ambitiously, to synthetically describe
our communicable experience. Within the framework of such an approach wave
functions, state operators and so on are, to repeat, essentially means of prediction
of observations and the elements of the ensemble that we work with are pieces
of empirical reality. And indeed, one of the most remarkable facts that quantum
mechanics revealed is that, far from being restricted to the description of some –
conjectured – man-independent Reality, mathematics are fully suitable for describing
such a man-dependent empirical reality.
In particular, mathematics yield convenient tools for synthetizing our predictive
knowledge concerning systems on which we assume that measurement have some-
how been done without their outcomes being known to us (or, more generally, of
which we assume that they interacted with macroscopic objects that can be treated
classically). Von Neumann’s “ignorance” mixtures (my “proper mixtures”) are pre-
cisely the tools in question. And, within the empirical reality approach that we are
here considering, to say that these tools cannot be created is no more true. Take a
beam of spin 1/2 particles polarized along Ox. Send it through an inhomogeneous
magnetic field directed along Oz and put counters on the two emerging paths. If,
in accordance with what the “man in the street” would say, you claim that, cor-
responding to each one of the beam particles, one (only) of the two counters did
really click (in the empirical reality sense), then you have to grant that (in the same
sense), beyond the counters the ensemble of the particles is a proper mixture.
It is true that, in principle, you are not quite obliged to take this standpoint.
You may boldly say: “to claim that the counters either really clicked or did not re-
ally click is an overnaive conception of what Reality is”, and then you can resort to
Kirkpatrick’s reasoning and state that the mixture is an improper one. If, notwith-
standing the conceptual difficulties, you kling to the view that the wave function
is an element of “Reality as it really is”, then – if, moreover, you believe quantum
mechanics is universal – you are even forced to take up the latter viewpoint. But,
to repeat, the conceptual difficulties just alluded to are, in fact, insuperable. The
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Bohr-like view that quantum mechanics is really a weakly objective theory is there-
fore a considerably more reasonable (and I would even say: “scientific”) approach.
And, to repeat, within its realm the notion of proper mixtures is fully valid.
5. Conclusion.
I think that, in substance, I answered all of Kirkpatrick’s objections, including
those bearing explicitely on measurement. In the latter, what Kirkpatrick stressed
is, in fact, just that, when a measurement occurs, the values of the measured ob-
servable must necessarily be correlated with something outside the system. This of
course is true but I have already considered the matter in Section 4 above since the
“something outside the system” is obviously a part of E . As his parenthesis begin-
ning by “Curiously...” reveals, what Kirkpatrick did not realize is that, in the case
of a measurement, the same subensemble of measured systems should be considered
either as a proper or as an improper mixture, according to whether we choose to
consider the instruments as being “on the classical side” or “on the quantum side”,
that is, according to where we decide to situate – by thought – the quantum-classical
cut (which, according to the views here reported in Section 3, separates the domain
in which we can use a realist language from the one in which we cannot, and depends
on what we are interested in).
One last but (I hope) not very significant point concerns Kirkpatrick’s remark,
at the end of his Section 5, relative to the ignorance interpretation. He there speaks
of the “temptation” to the interpretation of mixtures by ignorance, and he claims
that the fact all mixtures are improper gives a clearer understanding of the said
“temptation”. This language seems to mean that an ignorance interpretation of
the improper mixture is actually inconsistent. But then, when, in the first section
of his paper, we read: “D’Espagnat claims that an ignorance interpretation of the
improper mixture is inconsistent” we are somewhat at a loss. We get to wonder
where, according to him, the difference between us lies. Still, since he repeateadly
speaks of my “error” and emphasizes its importance, there must exist some differ-
ence! One conjecture would be that he situates “diversity”, “well-defined values”
and, therefore, “ignorance” at the extreme end of the von Neumann chain: within
some nonphysical “taking cognizance of definite values” element in it. On the other
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hand, it is clear that in his analysis of Hugues’ argument he took positions quite
incompatible with this hypothesis. I, therefore, have no clue. In last resort I cannot
completely rule out the hypothesis that, on this point, Kirkpatrick’s approach was
not entirely consistent.
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